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Galen's Response to Skepticism
PHILLIP DE LACY
Galen's commitment to a science of medicine that could accurately diagnose
diseases, identify symptoms and causes, and prescribe treatment brought him
into conflict not only with physicians who questioned the need for such
medical theory or the reasoning by which it was constructed, but also with
the skeptics, whose arguments raised doubts about the possibility of gaining
knowledge of the truth about any subject whatever and who held that it is
possible to live with suspension of judgment.^ Galen sometimes refuses to
talk to the doubters; they are "boorish Pyrrhonists"^ and contentious
The following abbreviations are used in references to Galen's writings:
CMG: Corpus Medicorum Graecorum.
K.: Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia, ed. Karl Gottlob Kiihn. 22 vols. (Leipzig 1821-
33; repr. Hildesheim 1964-65).
MM: Galen, Methodus Medendi.
PHP: Galen, De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (= CMG V 4.1.2).
SM: Claudii Galeni Pergameni Scripta Minora. 3 vols. (Leipzig 1884-93; repr..
Amsterdam 1967).
Miiller, B ewe is (note 20) refers to L Miiller, Uber Galens Werk vom
wissenschaftUchen Beweis, Abh. Bayer. Akad. 1895, No. 2.
Other editions of Galen's writings are identified by the name of the editor. The
following require an explanation, since they are in works not primarily on Galen:
De opt. doct. . . . Barigazzi (e.g. note 6) refers to A. Barigazzi, Favorino di
Arelate. Opere (Florence 1966).
Subf. emp. . . . Deichgr. (e.g. note 2) and De sectis . . . Deichgr. (e.g. note 164)
refer to K. Deichgraber, Die griechische Empirikerschule (Berlin 1930; repr.
1965).
' Cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 107, 108. Where possible pre-Galenic sources for skepticism are
cited. When Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius are cited, it is with the caveat that
their arguments may to some extent be post-Galenic. On possible echoes of Galen's
language in Sextus see below, 302-03.
Galen did not limit this abusive term to avowed Pyrrhonists. In An in arteriis 1 (4.
727. 9-12 K. = 172. 1-4 Furley-Wilkie), those who fled lo the altar of boorish
Pyrrhonism were Erasistrateans. In De praecognitione 5. 14-15 {CMG V 8.1, p. 98. 4-8),
it was Alexander of Damascus who would not believe his eyes. In De puis. diff. 4. 2 (8.
710. 13-17, 711. 1-3 K.), they were skeptics and aporelics, who were not sure of their
own feelings, and the physicians who were influenced by them. Similarly, in Subf. emp. 4
(49. 29-50. 1 Deichgr.), Galen calls the physician Cassius a Pyrrhonist. Galen expresses
the relation of skeptic to empiricist in Subf. emp. 11 (82. 28-31 Deichgr.) with the words:
Qualis autem est secundum totam vitam sceticus, talis est circa medicativam empericus.
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arguers.^ Yet he does not ignore them. Indeed counter-arguments, he says,
must be answered if one is not to be tossed about on waves of uncertainty."*
The first step in the defense of scientific method is to establish, in
answer to the skeptics' doubts, that there are criteria of truth. Galen
maintains that there are criteria in the specialized disciplines, and these
specialized criteria could not exist if human beings had no natural criteria.^
The person who devised the instruments of the arts such as the compass and
the yardstick started from the natural criteria,^ and it is by calling on the
student's natural criteria that the teacher points out his errors and corrects
them.'' Not only are there natural criteria; they are common to all of us.
For, Galen says, what is natural must be common to all and have a
common nature.* A possible reason for stressing that all persons have these
natural criteria may have been a desire to avoid the skeptics' argument that
what is not common is not natural,' or the charge to which the Stoics were
liable for their view that only the wise man has scientific knowledge. From
that it would follow that the rest of us do not share the ability to separate
true from false. ^^ There are some, Galen says, who admit that the criterion
requires no proof but who do not admit that it is natural or common to all.^^
He may have had the Stoics or Epicureans in mind.
In opposing the argument from the arts the skeptics say that
appearances are sufficient criteria for choice and avoidance,^^ and the arts
provide things useful for life through the observation of appearances.^^ The
arts do not require a criterion that separates true from false. ^"^ Galen
concedes that right opinion is as good as knowledge in practical matters, but
it lacks stability and permanence.^ ^ It was the certainty that he found in
3 Cf. De peccat. dignot. 3. 23-24 {CMG V 4.1.1. pp. 51. 22-52. 11) and De ord. libr.
suor. 1 (19. 52 K. = SM 2. 82. 3-11).
* Synops. libr. suor. de puis. 1 (9. 432. 8-12 K.).
^ PHP 9. 1. 10 (p. 542. 7-8). The same point was made by LucuUus, the spokesman for
Anliochus, in Cic. Acad. 2. 22; cf. also 2. 146.
^De opt. doct. 4 (1. 48^9 K. = 184. 2-6 Barigazzi).
'Dc opt. doct. 2 (1. 44 K. = 180. 33-81. 11 Barigazzi).
^ PHP 9. 1. 11 (p. 542. 8-11). On nature as common to aU members of a class see
below, 293.
' The skeptics used the proposition that what is not common is not natural in arguing
that there is no common good; see Sextus, PH 3. 179 and AM 1. 147; Diog. Laer. 9. 101.
^°Cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 145; Sextus, AM 7. 152. Arcesilaus, according to Sextus (AM 7.
153), argued that on the Stoic view there can be no middle ground between the knowledge
of the wise man and the opinions of the ordinary man. Galen recognizes, of course, that
not all men are equally adept at using the natural criteria; cf. Thrasyb. 24 (5. 846-47 K. =
SM 3. 62. 9-12).
i> PHP 9. 7. 5 (p. 586. 23-27).
12 Cf. Sextus. AM 1. 29-30.
13 Cf. Sextus. AM 5. 2; Cic. Acad. 2. 107.
1* Cic. Acad. 2. 146.
1^ Gal. De ord. libr. suor. 2 (19. 54 K. = SM 2. 83. 17-23), with an apparent allusion
to Plato. Meno 96d-98a.
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mathematics that saved him from Pyrrhonic skepticism. ^^ Mathematical
reasoning was for him the model for philosophy and medicine. ^^ The
skeptics had of course questioned the fundamental concepts of mathematics.
Cameades, Galen tells us, refused to believe that magnitudes equal to the
same thing are equal to each other. He dismisses such an attack on the
evident as a sophism.'*
Having established the existence of natural criteria, Galen now identifies
them. They are, according to De plac. Hipp, et Plat., the eyes in their
natural state seeing things that are visible, the ears in their natural state
hearing things that are audible, the tongue tasting savors, the nostrils
smelling odors, the skin touching things touchable, and the mind or
intellect or whatever you want to call it, by which we distinguish what
follows and what conflicts and the like.'^ Trusting in these natural criteria
we accept as true what appears clearly to the senses or the mind.^ They are
the criteria that make possible the special criteria of the special disciplines.^'
It is necessary, then, to distinguish between appearances that are clearly
true and those that are not. Galen considered clear sensation and thought
equivalent to the Stoic KaxaXriTiTiKTi (pavTaoia,^^ and he therefore had to
defend his view against the attacks of the skeptics on that Stoic view. It
was first criticized by the Academic skeptics, and their criticism was
broadened by the Pyrrhonist Aenesidemus to refute any attempt to move
from the evident to the non-evident.^^ Aenesidemus' ten tropes give a list of
^^De libr. prop. 11 (19. 40 K. = SM 2. 116. 20-23).
'^ See for examples PHP 8. 1. 25 (p. 486. 12, with the note on p. 684). Other
examples, of which there are many, include Subf. emp. 12 (90. 2-4 Deichgr.) and De
peccat. dignot. 3. 2-A {CMC V 4.1.1. p. 46. 7-23). In PHP 8. 1. 20 (p. 484. 22-26).
Galen asserts that those who have mastered Euclid's proof that the earth is the center of the
universe accept it as confidently as they do that 2x2 = 4. In calling the elements of the art
of medicine its theorems (Gecopfmata) Galen may have intended an allusion to the
theorems of mathematics; see De part. art. med. 4, 5 (CMC Suppl. Or. 11, pp. 122. 30-34,
124. 19-20) and the reference to Gecopfinata ypajiniKa in De usu part. 10. 14 (3. 838 K.
= 2. 110. 23-24 Helmieich).
^^ De opt. doct. 2 (1. 45 K. = 181. 14-82. 5 Barigazzi). Galen often refers to the
arguments of the skeptics as sophisms; see below, 286.
^^PHP 9. 1. 13 (p. 542. 13-20). In A/M 1. 3 (10. 29. 3 K.) Galen identifies the criteria
as neipa and X6yo<;. Ileipa is the criterion of drugs in De simpl. med. 3. 6, 10 (11. 552.
13-15. 560. 18 K.).
^ See for example De opt. doct. 4 (1. 49 K. = 184. 16-18 Barigazzi) and the discussion
in Miiller, Beweis 29-34. For examples of things clear to the mind see below, 305 and
306.
2^ Cf. PHP 9. 1. 10. 23 (pp. 542. 7-8, 544. 17-21); De opt. doct. 4 (1. 48-50 K. =
184. 2-6, 18-19 Barigazzi).
^^Cf. PHP 9. 7. 3 (p. 586. 18-21). In De opt. doct. 2 (1. 42 K. = 180. 5-8 Barigazzi)
Galen equates the Stoic KataXriTixof; with PePaiax; TvcoaTO^.
^^ For Aenesidemus see Pholius, Bibl. 212 (3. 121 Henry). One of Aenesidemus'
arguments was quoted by Sextus in AM 8. 234.
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obstacles that confront anyone who wishes to determine which, if any, sense
perceptions give accurate information about anything beyond themselves.^^
In general terms Galen counters the arguments of the skeptics in three
basic ways. (1) He appeals to the universal agreement of mankind.
Everyone agrees that the judgment of true and false is to be referred to clear
perception and thought.^^ Everyone except Academics and Pyrrhonists
believes that what we see when awake is a source of firm knowledge, and
what we see in dreams is false.^^ (2) He calls the skeptics' arguments
sophistical. Those who would argue that it is unclear whether we are awake
or asleep, or, if that is clear, whether what we see when awake is any more
to be trusted than what we see when asleep, do not believe their own
arguments. They are indulging in eristic.^^ (3) He charges the skeptics
with upsetting human Ufe. If what we see when awake, in good health, and
sane is no more credible than what we see when asleep, sick, or mad,^* the
criteria of truth are thrown into disarray (ovyKixoxai)?^
A fourth general charge, aimed at those who fall under the influence of
the skeptics, is that they lack training in logic and scientific method. Some
physicians, Galen says, doubt the evident because of sophisms that they are
unable to solve.^^ And philosophers of all schools, including Academics
and Skeptics, are blind to their own errors when they dare to make
statements about things apart from proof and logical method.^^
But in addition to his overall denunciation of skepticism Galen responds
to specific difficulties raised by the skeptics. One such difficulty was that if
some appearances are true and some are false, there must be a criterion by
which we judge which appearances are true. But this criterion requires a
^ The ten tropes are presented by Sextus in PH 1. 36-163 and more briefly by Diog.
Laer. 9. 79-88. It is impossible to tell how far Sextus and Diogenes departed from
Aenesidemus' text; but presumably they did not greatly alter the overall import of the
tropes. Sextus may have added some of the medical examples that he gives. I follow
Sextus* numbering of the tropes.
^^ See for example PHP 9. 7. 3 (p. 586. 19-20). Galen appeals also to common
notions; see for example De plenit. 8 (7. 551. 9-10 K.).
^De opt. doct. 2 (1. 42 K. = 180. 8-14 Barigazzi). The argument from dreaming and
being awake is in Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sextus, PH 1. 104.
^Wn Hipp. De vicl. acut. convn. 1. 16 {CMG V 9.1. p. 132. 10-15). See also below,
note 47.
^Cf. Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sextus. PH 1. 100. 104.
^' Gal. De opt. doct. 2 (1. 43 K. = 180. 19 Barigazzi). Cf. also MM 2. 7 (10. 155. 1-5
K.); De caus. procatarc. 92. 201 {CMG Suppl. E. pp. 22. 26-27. 54. 20-23); De simp,
med. 1. 36. 37. 39 (11. 443. 4-12. 448. 13. 16-17. 455. 4 K.). In De puis, dignosc. 1. 2
(8. 786. 5 K.) Galen dismisses an otnopia of the empiricists as of no importance, as it
cannot overturn the use of clear appearances. See below. 295. Sextus. AM 8. 157 denies
that the skeptic causes life to be confused. In De elem. 1. 5 (1. 451 K. = 28. 18-20
Helmreich) Galen includes the monists among those who overturn life.
3°De caus. procatarc. 115-25. 141 {CMC Suppl. II. pp. 28-30. 36. 3-5). See also
below, note 68.
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demonstration, which in return requires a criterion, and so on.^^ Galen
replies that it is madness, it is Pyrrhonic nonsense, to require a criterion
prior to sense-perception or a logical demonstration of the truth of
perceptibles. If that were so, one would need a proof that snow is white.^^
We don't need a criterion from outside for what we all have by nature.^'*
Things clear to sense-perception and thought are the starting-point of all
proof, and the person who doubts them has left himself nowhere to begin.^^
It was no doubt to avoid the regress of criteria for criteria that Galen says in
PHP 9. 1. 12 (p. 542. 1 1-13) that he is reminding us of the natural criteria,
not teaching or proving them.^^
Of course Galen recognized that the same thing may appear different to
different persons or to the same person at different times and under different
circumstances.^^ He recognized also that things clear to thought may
sometimes appear to be in conflict with things clear to sense. But the
person trained in these matters will show that there is no real conflict.^
^
One source of seeming conflict is rashness of assent. Some people are
deceived when from rashness they assent to things not yet clear as though
they were clear.^' Seeing a person at a distance, they say confidently that it
is Theon, but they are proved wrong when at close range it turns out to be
Dion.'^o
^^ Again Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sexlus, PH 1. 114-17. See also Sextus, AM 7.
340. 342; Diog. Laer. 9. 91. The first of Aenesidemus' tropes (Sextus, PH 1. 59-61) also
raises the issue of proving the truth of perceptions: Since things appear differently to men
and animals, we can say how they appear to us, but not how they are in their own nature.
We cannot assert without proof that our appearances are better, nor can we prove it, since
proof would require a judge above both men and animals. The demand for a sign by which
true appearances can be separated from false was made by the Academics in their
controversy with the Stoics. What is the distinguishing mark, the propria nota, of the
cognitive appearance? Cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 35, 101, 103.
^^ There is probably an allusion here to Anaxagoras, whose black snow is sometimes
mentioned in controversies about the accuracy of sense-perception. See for example Gal.
De simp. med. 2. 1 (11. 461. 14-16 K.); De temp. 2. 2 (1. 589 K. = 50. 26-29 Helmreich);
and for the skeptics, Cic. Acad. 2. 72 and Sextus, PH 1. 33.
^PHP 9. 8. 25 (p. 596. 20-21).
35 De temp. 2. 2 (1. 588-90 K. = 50. 13-51. 17 Helmreich). Cf. also De simp. med. 1.
30. 2. 1 (11. 434. 16-35. 3. 459. 1-61. 9 K.).
3^ Galen's term for reminding is avajiijivfiaKcov. One would expect it to be used by
empiricists and skeptics, but the evidence is slight. Janacek's index to Sextus lists only
two occurrences. For the empiricists see Gal. De sect. 8 (1. 92 K. = SM 3. 22. 4-5) (the
empiricist is speaking): eoxai 6e Kai vvv 6 Xoyoi; dvdjivnaii; xov (paivojievou and De
plenit. 9 (7. 558. 5-7 K.): apd ye ndvG' djia tci eipTijieva o\)veX,9eiv 8ei Jtpoq xfjv ox;
avToi X,eYO\)Oiv dvdnviioiv zr\c, Kevcooeox; . . . ;
"See for example De san. tuend. 1. 5. 7 {CMG V 4.2. pp. 8. 32-9. 1).
^^De peccat. dignot. 6. 3 {CMG V 4.1.1, p. 63. 7-10).
"Ibid. 6. 3 (p. 63. 11-13).
^ Ibid. 6. 4 (p. 63. 15-18); cf. 6. 6 (pp. 63. 25-64. 2).
288 Illinois Classical Studies, XVI
Those friends who heard a report that a traveller had returned and rashly
announced his arrival were proved to be in error.'*^ If people persist in
assenting rashly in matters that can be verified, what will they do in obscure
matters?'*^ The cause of their rashness, Galen decides, is their desire to show
that they are quicker than their neighbors to make some discovery, whether
by the senses or by ihought.'*^ To a skeptic rashness is a disease afflicting
dogmatists that the skeptic, being a man of good will, would like to cure.'*'^
But Galen maintains that those who have honored their rational power as
their greatest glory and have sought to train and perfect it are neither rash
nor boastful.'*^
A different kind of problem is raised by the relativity of hot and cold,
dry and wet. It often happens that the same thing appears warm to the touch
at one time, cold at another."*^ If you say that Dion's crasis is dry and hot, a
sophist could easily say that in comparison with those whose crasis is
hotter and dryer, Dion's crasis is wet and cold."*^ Galen's answer is that
there are standards that make it possible to say that a crasis is in fact hot or
cold, dry or wet. For each class of animal and plant there is a mean crasis
best suited in each case to its proper activity. If an animal or plant is above
the mean for its class, it may be said to be hot; if below it, cold."^* But
there is also a midpoint that applies universally to all substances of all
kinds, the mean between the cosmic extremes of hot and cold, dry and wet.
In terms of this mean a crasis may in absolute terms be said to be hot or
cold, dry or wet."*^ Now as it happens, the human skin is precisely at the
midpoint of these cosmic extremes, and of the human skin that of the hand,
and of the hand that on the inside.^^ The skin of the inner side of the hand,
therefore, of the well-tempered person, whose hands have not been hardened
or calloused by digging or rowing, is the standard (Kavova xe Kal olov
*' Ibid. 6. 8 (p. 64. 15-17).
« Ibid. 6. 10 (p. 65. 2-5).
*^ Ibid. 6. 1 1 (p. 65. 9-14).
** Cf. Sexlus, PH 3. 280-81. The charge of Ttponeteia had a long history in the
controversies between skeptics and dogmatists. Colotes had used it against the Academy
of Arcesilaus, and Plutarch in reply turned it against the Epicureans. See Plut. Adv. Col.
1124b-c. It appears in Cicero as temeritas; see for example Acad. 1. 42, 45; 2. 31, 66.
*^De peccat. dignot. 5. 17-18 {CMC V 4.1.1, p. 59. 9-15).
^De simp. med. 3. 8 (11. 554. 11-12 K.).
^'' De temp. 1. 6 (1. 549 K. = 25. 15-23 Helmreich). The sophist here is not
necessarily a skeptic. Galen may have had in mind a commenutor on Hippocrates; see De
temp. 1. 7 (1. 553-54 K. = 28. 12-21 Helmreich). The skeptics, however, did use the
relativity of hot and cold as an argument against the trustworthiness of sense-perception.
See for example Sextus, PH 2. 56, and Aenesidemus' fourth trope: Sextus, PH 1. 101, 1 10.
^'^De temp. 1. 6 (1. 544-47 K. = 23. 1-24. 19 Helmreich).
'*' Ibid. 1. 6 (1. 550 K. = 26. 6-16 Hebnreich).
5° Ibid. 1. 9 (1. 563-65 K. = 34. 20-35. 16 Helmreich).
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KpiTTipiov) by which you may discover faulty erases in all parts of the
body.5i
Galen gives a very different explanation of the taste of honey. Honey
when heated changes to yellow bile. In the body of a person who is cool it
keeps its sweetness and easily changes to blood; but it quickly turns to bile
in the body of a person who is hot and feverish, and for that reason it tastes
bitter.52 Sextus raises the problem of the taste of honey in his account of
Aenesidemus' fourth trope,^^ and he goes on to argue that if one says that it
is the combination of humors in a perceiver whose state is unnatural that
gives the honey its unnatural taste, one might equally well say that the
combination of humors in the healthy person gives the honey an unnatural
taste.^'* If this argument was actually made by Aenesidemus and is not
merely Sextus' own elaboration of the fourth trope, it could have been
known to Galen; and he may have tried to avoid it by placing the change in
the honey itself. The two different tastes are of two different substances.
A much more serious problem for Galen is that of distinguishing
between objects whose appearances are very similar, for the differentiation of
things in terms of similarities and differences was an essential part of his
scientific method.^^ The Academic skeptics had argued that a perception is
not cognitive if, on seeing one of two or more very similar things, we don't
know which one we are looking at. Their examples included twins, eggs,
imprints of a seal, and Lysippus' statues of Alexander.^^ In De peccat.
dignot. Galen takes up the problem of the twins which he finds analogous
to the nXdvaq Kai dnopiaq that closely similar things cause for
physicians as well as philosophers. Like Cicero's Lucullus, he points out
that those who are familiar with the twins can easily distinguish one from
the other.^'^ In De crisibus Galen draws an analogy between recognizing
diseases and recognizing persons. Each, he says, has its own distinctive
mark, which the person who has seen it frequently and continually can
^> Ibid. 1. 9 (1. 566-68 K. = 36. 20-37. 24 Helmreich); see also 2. 1 (1. 575-77 K. =
41. 24-43. 9 Helmreich). Similarly in De simp. med. 3. 8 (11. 555. 17 K.) Galen calls
touch the yvcoficov of hot and cold, and on the next page (556. 12-15 K.) he warns that
something may be called hot or cold in an absolute sense only when compared to the mean
and best human crasis.
"De simp. med. 4. 17 (11. 675. 15-77. 6 K.); cf. also De alim. fac. 3. 38. 3. 6. 7
{CMG V 4.2. pp. 380. 20-81. 4. 381. 21-29); De antidotis 1. 4 (14. 21. 5-15 K.).
^' Sextus, PH 1. 101. Sextus raises the problem of the taste of honey also in AM 8.
53-54.
5^ Sextus. P// 1. 102-03.
^* The ninth book of PHP, for example, is devoted entirely to the problem of knowing
how to distinguish between very similar things.
5^ Cic. Acad. 2. 54. 84-86.
^^ De peccat. dignot. 2. 4-5 {CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 43. 25-44. 11); cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 57.
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easily recognizees Here Galen has conceded that one must have prior
knowledge in order to identify a veridical perception, and to that extent he
has departed from his doctrine that the clear perception is the starting-point
of knowledge. Clear perception in the case of twins requires prior
knowledge of the difference between them.
Other problems in the differentiation of things in terms of similarities
and differences were raised by the sorites. The skeptics used the sorites to
point out the difficulty of establishing boundaries. Their examples included
the boundary between grain and heap, hill and mountain, deity and non-
deity, rich and poor, clear and unclear, few and many, small and large, short
and long, narrow and wide, virtue and vice, good and evil, true and false.^'
In a more specific attack on Stoic epistemology Sextus argued that as the
last cognitive appearance lies beside the first non-cognitive appearance and
no boundary can be drawn, the cognitive cannot be differentiated from the
non-cognitive. If "fifty are few" is a cognitive appearance, and "ten
thousand are few" is non-cognitive, where is the dividing line?^
Of course the sorites, which Galen also calls 6 napa ^iiKpov Xoyoq,^'
was not used exclusively by skeptics. Dogmatists used it against
empiricists, and empiricists in turn used it against dogmatists.^^ It was first
formulated and named, apparently, by the Megaric Eubulides,^^ ^ut there is
something very much like it in a passage from Plato's Phaedrus that Galen
quoted in PHP, where Socrates says that it is easier to go undetected from
one thing to the opposite if one proceeds Kaxa o|iiKp6v, and that the one
who is to deceive another without being deceived himself must distinguish
accurately the similarity and difference in things.^
Galen responds to the problem of the sorites in several ways. He
acknowledges that it is common to many things in life and has been
discussed by many philosophers and physicians.^^ You can ignore it, he
says, and in many places you have to; but when it is possible to set clear
boundaries it is not a good idea to expose yourself to unnecessary
difficulties.^
^* De crisibus 2. 9 (9. 684 K. = 153. 15-25 Alexanderson). Cicero, as spokesman for
the New Academy, had argued {Acad. 2. 84) that the inability to distinguish between twins
results from the lack of a mark (noia) by which true is distinguished from false.
^^ See for example Cic. Acad. 2. 49. 92-95; De nal. dear. 3. 43-50; De div. 2. 11;
Sextus, AM 9. 182-90.
^ Sextus, AM 7. 415-21; cf. PH 2. 253-54.
" Cf. Gal. De loc. aff. 1. 2 (8. 25. 16-17 K.).
"See De exp. med. 7. 5-10; 12. 8; 15-18; 20 (95-97, 106. 111-21. 123-26 Walzer);
Subf. emp. 3 (47. 1-4 Deichgr.).
^^ Diog. Uer. 2. 108.
" Plat. Phaedr. 261e6-62c3, quoted by Galen in PHP 9. 2. 14-16 (pp. 546. 35^8.
13).
^^ De loc. aff. 1.2 (8. 25. 17-26. 1 K.).
^De marcore 4 (7. 680. 4-9 K.).
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Insofar as the sorites leads to the conclusion that there is no mountain,
since the addition of a single foot, at whatever point, is not enough to
change the hill into a mountain, Galen would no doubt agree with the view
that he attributes to the empiricists in De exp. med., that the sorites is
fallacious since it is contradicted by what is plain to the senses.^'' Denying
that there is such a thing as a mountain is like denying that there are such
things as vision, generation and destruction, motion, aging, change of
winter to spring, spring to summer, summer to fall, because you cannot
explain how they come about.^*
But the problem remains how to find the boundaries between kinds of
things. When faced with the soritic question—^When does old age begin?
—
Galen finds the answer in the increase in the relative amount of liquids
discharged from the body. Old age is a drying out.^^ It is thought to be wet
because the discharge of liquids increases, the body being no longer able to
retain them.^^ A clear boundary, therefore, between the decline from the
prime of life and the beginning of old age is the predominance
(eTUKpaxTioK;) of those fluid discharges that deceived people into thinking
that old age is wet.^'
Galen has a very different explanation of the beginning of disease. It
rests on the distinction between change in form and change in magnitude.
In homoeomerous parts of the body a disease begins the moment the hot or
cold or wet or dry exceeds healthy limits in the crasis of the body. At that
point the boundaiy has been crossed. The disease now has its proper form,
but it may be too small to be detected by the physician or the patient, just
as the first drop of water to hit the rock begins to hollow it out, although
the hollow is not yet perceptible. Nature can cure small affections, but
when they become too large for nature to overcome, then outside help is
needed.^^ The form of the disease, however, is independent of its magnitude.
^''De exp. med. 17. 6-8 (118-19 Walzer).
^ De exp. med. 15-16 (113-15 Walzer); cf. also 19 and 20 (122-26 Walzer). The
theme that to deny the existence of something that is evident because one cannot explain
it is the result of misguided reasoning appears also in De semine 2. 4 (4. 620. 5-6, 10-13
K.); An in arteriis 6 (4. 721. 10-12 K.); De caus. procatarc. 115-16, 123 (CA/G Suppl. E.
pp. 28-29. 30); De consuet. 1 {CMG Suppl. Ill, p. 2). Galen does not teU us which
argument against motion he has in mind. The argument of Diodorus Cronus is given by
Sextus, AM 1. 311-12, 10. 85-87. 143; it is not in the fonm of a sorites. Neither Galen
nor Sextus, so far as I know, mentions Zeno's paradox of motion.
^De marcore 3. 4 (7. 672. 10-13. 678. 15-17 K.).
'"Cf. De temp. 2. 2 (1. 580-82 K. = 45. 9^6. 14 Helmreich).
'I De marcore 4 (7. 680. 9-12 K.).
'^De loc. aff. 1. 2 (8. 26. 3-28. 18 K.). Compare Ars med. 4 (1. 316. 4-17. 13 K.).
where the continuum from the best condition of the body to painful and crippling disease is
divided by clear visual differences; but when there is a weakening of activities the
difference between the extremes is easy to recognize but lesser differences are unclear. A
condition in this ambiguous middle zone is neither, owBexepa. This analysis, like that in
De loc. aff., recognizes the difference between the nature of things and their appearance.
The author says that appearance should be used in setting boundaries. He rejects setting
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Still another response is simply to leave the boundaries imprecise and
to make the uncertainty a matter of name-giving. Galen says in De febr.
diff. that paroxysms of different durations are given different names. It is
not possible to define the boundaries precisely because of the soritic puzzle;
but it is not necessary to look for such precision in names, since we can
prescribe treatment without them.'^^ Similarly in In Hipp. Progn. comm.
the question whether a fever with a crisis after the fourteenth day, on up to
the seventeenth or even the twentieth day, can still be called acute, becomes
a soritic problem which involves names only.^"*
What limits can be set to great and small, fast and slow? Galen faces
this problem in De puis, dignosc. 2. 1-2. One of his students suggested
that they have an indefinite range but are limited in the sense that one can
think of things outside the limits. The size of a city is indefinite, but no
city consists of only three households, and no city stretches out to a
thousand stades. No mountain is a foot high, but no mountain reaches the
moon.^^ On this view both the upper and the lower limit of a class of
objects is left indeterminate. But Galen rejects this analogy. There is no
upper limit too large, and no lower limit. Such terms as large and small,
hard and soft, have a fixed meaning only within a class of objects in which
there is a midpoint, a mean, a measure, jieao) xe Kal iiexpico Kai
a\)|ijiExptp, that can serve as canon and criterion. This mean, Galen says, is
sought in all of life. The arts, especially, are engaged in the pursuit of it."^^
Then after a long discussion Galen explains how to find the a-umxexpoq
The recognition that a clear perception does not always become clear
until the proper preliminaries have been carried out is nowhere more evident
than in Galen's identification, in PHP 9, of his (pavxaaia evapynq not
only with the Stoic (pavxaaia KaxaXrjTixiKTi but also with Cameades'
persuasive appearance, including its three requirements: ot) jxovov TiiGavriv
aXkcL Kal 7tepito6et)|ievT|v Kal dTiepianaoxov.^* Consistent with this
natural boundaries between disease and health on the ground that it would lead to the
doctrine of oteindGeia (317. 11-13). I take this warning to mean that if disease is a lack
of the proper proportion in the crasis of hot and cold and dry and wet, then only the best
constitution would be free of it, since bodies that are healthy but not in the best state have
already some small defect in their crasis (cf. 314. 15-15. 2; 315. 14-17). Here the author
of Ars medica, whether Galen or not, is clearly trying to avoid the sorites.
''^Defebr. diff 2. 10 (7. 371. 10-72. 14 K.).
"*/n Hipp. Progn. comm. 3. 15 {CMG V 9.2, p. 342. 12-30).
^^Z)c puis, dignosc. 2. 1 (8. 840. 11-41. 12 K.). Compare the Epicureans on limits of
variation, Philodemus' man of iron who walks through walls {De sign. col. 21), and
Lucretius' superman who wades through the sea and tears great mountains apart with his
hands (1. 199-201).
''^De puis, dignosc. 2. 2 (8. 841. 13^3. 12 K.).
" De puis, dignosc. 2. 2 (8. 857. 10-58. 17 K.).
78 pffp 9 7 3 (p 586 16-20); cf. also PHP 9. 9. 37 (p. 606. 20-21). For Cameades'
three requirements see Cic. Acad. 2. 33-36 and Sextus, PH 1. 227-29, AM 7. 166-84.
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identification is his warning against assenting to an appearance
d7uepiaKE7tTC0(;7' These preliminaries, as described in PHP 9. 2, are
themselves a modified sorites. As a method for distinguishing between very
similar things Galen says that one should start with the greatest and easiest
differences.*^ Having established these, one may advance Kaxa Ppax'u to
the differences that are slight. In other words, instead of starting at one pole
and advancing gradually from that, as the sorites does, we should first
establish two polar opposites and then advance gradually from each toward
the other, using the same criteria that we used to establish the poles.*^ The
well-trained master of a discipline will be able by this means to separate the
false from the true.*^
After defending the trustworthiness of clear appearances, Galen must
next defend against skeptic attack the method of passing from the evident to
the non-evident. Galen's term for this is endeixis, "indication," which, he
says in Meth. med.l. 7 (10. 126. 10-11 K.), is as it were the disclosure of
the consequence, olov eVtpaaw vv\c, dKoA.o\)0ia<;. It is not an inference from
a particular perceived thing; it is rather an inference from the very nature of
the thing, e^ a\>xx\c, xr\c, xot) 7ip(X7|iaTo<; (pTJoecoc; (ibid. p. 127. 1). Here
"the very nature of the thing" is not a periphrasis for "the thing" or "the
thing itself."*^ Nature in this context is something that transcends the
individual and is shared by other members of the group to which the
individual belongs. As Galen says about the natural criteria, what is natural
must be common to all.*'* It is from this common nature that inferences are
made by endeixis, and endeixis gives us truths that apply generally to all
members of a class. Applying this to medicine, Galen says that in order to
find the cure for every disease one must first find the generic and conimon
endeixis of all diseases and from there proceed to the species (ibid. p. 128.
4-6).
In explaining this generic approach to disease Galen introduces a
Platonic term. The reason all diseases are called diseases is necessarily
because they all participate in one and the same thing, evoq Kal xavxot)
This Cameadean scheme may have been one of the things that Galen recognized as sound
(vYieq) in the earlier Academics; see De opt. doct. 3 (1. 47 K. = 183. 3-4 Barigazzi).
^» PHP 5. 4. 12 (p. 314. 33); In Hipp. Epid. HI comm. 3. 76 {CMG V 10.2.1, p. 166.
19); In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 2. 27 {CMG V 10.2.2, p. 91. 8-11, 16). Cf. also PHP 9. 9.
38-39 (p. 606. 22 [oKeyiq] and 606. 28 [aoKentoi]).
*° PHP 9. 2. 3 (pp. 544. 36-46. 1). The allusion is to the Hippocratic dno xoiv
HeyvoTtov Kal ptiioxtov {De off. med. 1 [3. 272 Littre]), quoted in PHP 9. 1. 14 (p. 542.
22). Quoting this same phrase in In Hipp. Progn. comm. 1. 5 {CMG V 9.2, p. 210. 1-2)
Galen says that this is the starting-point not only for prognosis but also for the
indications (ev6ei^ei<;) of what must be done.
81 PHP 9. 2. 4 (p. 546. 1-2).
*2Cf. PHP 9. 7. 18-19 (p. 590. 2-9).
*^ On "the nature of as periphrasis see Plutarch's charge in Adv. Col. 1112f that when
Epicurus says "the nature of the void" he simply means "the void."
** See above, 284 and note 8.
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|j.E0e^£i (ibid. p. 128. 7). He then gives examples of things that have the
same name by virtue of what is the same in them (ibid. p. 128. 8-15).
When two or more different kinds of things have the same name for each of
its meanings, the name refers to what is one and the same in some one kind
of thing. A dog may be a land dog or a sea dog. They have only the name
"dog" in common; they do not have a common nature (ibid. p. 129. 2-4).
At this point Galen introduces another Platonic term: For all land dogs
there is one eiSoq by virtue of which they are called dogs (ibid. p. 129. 17-
18); and two pages later iSea is used along with ei5o<; as that to which the
name refers (ibid. p. 131. 17-18).^^ There is clearly some close relation
here between <px>oiq and eISck; and i6ea. They all refer to that shared unity
of members of a class on which the dogmatist bases his endeixis}^
Empiricists and skeptics had doubts about the possibility of knowing
the nature of things. Aenesidemus had argued that since the appearance of
things differs with the difference in animals, we will be able to say how an
object is seen by us, but we shall stop short of saying what kind of thing it
is in its nature, onoiov jiev T\\nv Gecopeixai to {)7ioKe{^evov e^o|i£v
Xiyeiv, oTioiov 8e eoxi npbc, Tqv (pijoiv ecpe^o^ev.^'' In De puis, dignosc.
Galen says that the empiricists professed ignorance of the nature of things,
1X115' oXcoq |j.Ti5ev ctTtavxcov cuq e^ei (puaei yivcooKEiv,** and he links
them to the Pyrrhonists by quoting a Une from Timon that was quoted also
by Sextus and Diogenes Laertius, to (paivo^ievov TidvTn oGevei oiinep av
eX0-p.*' Galen rejects their talk about not knowing the nature of things as
*^ Galen uses the term ei6o(; frequently in the following pages of MM 2. 7. See also
Inst. log. 12. 8 (29. 5 Kalbfleisch): Kal yap eotiv ox; ei5o<; ev and ibid. 18. 3 (45. 19-
21): TO yap eiSoi; ri\c, SiKaioovivtn;, d(p' o\> Xiycxai ndvxa xa Kaxa \i.ipoc, 6iKaia.
Things are given their ei8oi; by the four eiSonoiol jioiottitec;, De simp. med. 3. 4 (11.
546. 17-47. 5 K.) or by eiSonoiol Siacpopai, MM 1. 3 (10. 23. 10-14 K.). For iSEa see
Ti (or xi) . . . npayna fiiav i6eav ezov, MM 2. 7 (10. 144. 3, 5 K.). Galen sees a
reference to this unifying one also in the terms yi\/o(^,MM 2. 7 (10. 139. 10 K.), p
(favored by empiricists), ibid. 129. 8. 130. 5-9. 136. 4-5. 140. 9-13. 142. 13 K.. and
KOivoTpq (favored by methodists). ibid. 141. 14-16. 142. 12 K.
*^ The close relation between <p\)a\.q and tlSoq and i6ea is evident also in such
passages as De simp. med. 3. 4 (11. 546. 16-17 K.): Kaxa xr\\/ ovoiav oXtiv
aXXoiovxai (sc. 6 apxoq) Kal xf\c; apxaiac, E^ioxaxai <pvo£(oq. tic, EXEpov EiSoq
\icQiaxa.\itvoc„ Inst. log. 12. 9 (29. 7-8 Kalbfleisch): aX\a xo\> xoioiixou ye ei5o-o<;
aiixou \iia cpvaic; taxi, and In Hipp. Aph. comm. 2. 34 (17 B. 532. 7-8 K.): eoxiv oxe
yap ovond^owoi. <pvoiv Kal xaiixriv (sc. xfiv i6£av). Endeixis may be from an i6Ea: ek
xfii; Eauxcov \hia^ EvSEiKvvxai. In Hipp. Epid. I comm. 2. 47 {CMG V 10.1. p. 72. 19).
In conjoining nature and form Galen may have been influenced by such Platonic
expressions as x6 cpvaei 6iKaiov. Resp. 6, 501b2.
" Sextus. PH 1. 59; cf. 1. 117. 128. 129. 134. 163; Diog. Laer. 9. 86; and
Aenesidemus, 170bl5-16 in Phot. Bibl. 212 (3. 121 Henry).
^* Gal. De puis, dignosc. 1. 2 (8. 782. 6-7 K.).
*^ De puis, dignosc. 1. 2 (8. 781. 10 K.); Sextus. AM 7. 30; Diog. Uer. 9. 105. Cf.
also Galen's ridicule of those who sit oKEnxonevovc; Kal aTiopowvxou;, De puis, dignosc.
1. 2 (8. 783. 4 K.). The passage from 8. 780. 14 to 785. 1 K. is quoted by Deichgraber.
Die gr. Empirikerschule 133-34, with textual corrections.
Phillip De Lacy 295
no more than idle talk.^*' Since in their actions in medicine and in the rest
of life they trust their senses and follow them, just like everyone else, their
aporia cannot overturn the use of clear appearances.'^
Empiricists and skeptics had also doubted the existence of an txhoc, that
is common to many particulars. Sextus raised the question how a genus,
being one thing, could be present in all its species;*^ and he asked how it is
that the av0pto7io(; by participation in which we are held to be human
beings is not one of us.'^ The empiricists, Galen says, asked to be shown
this avGptoTioq auToq Ka0' Eavxov apart from individual avGptoTioi.''*
Galen's answer is again aimed at the empiricists. He defends his own
position by an argument from names. The unifying one is something, for
it can be named, e.g. horse, empiricist, disease; and the name is the name of
something. 95 jf ^^ name signifies one thing, the form of the thing is
necessarily one.^
Arguing from names is treacherous. Names can be the names of more
than one thing, such as "dog" and "tongue."'^ They may be mere words,
signifying nothing, like pXkvpi and aKiv6a\}/6(;,'* or they may, like Scylla
and Centaur, have a meaning for which there is no corresponding object.'^
They may say nothing because they arise from a mistaken view of things,
like Archigenes' "heavy pulse."^^ Such names as hot, cold, dry, wet may
be ambiguous because of the many different objects of which they are
used.^^^ Theambiguity of names is a source of sophistical arguments. ^^2 ^
is clear, then, that when Galen says that there is one thing signified by such
a name as avBpcoTtcx; or voock;, he does not mean that from the name we can
infer the existence of a class of objects that are in some sense one, but rather
9°De puis, dignosc. 1. 2 (8. 785. 2 K.).
**' Ibid. 1. 2 (8. 786. 4-6 K.). See also 783. 18 and 785. 4 K.
'2 Sexius, P// 2. 219-22.
" Sextus. AM 10. 288-91.
^ Galen, MM 2. 7 (10. 140. 14-16 K.); cf. ibid. 152. 6-10; 154. 15-16.
'5 See MM 2. 7 (10. 128. 13-15. 143. 1, 144. 2-4. 155. 10-13 K.).
^^MM 2.7 (10. 131. 17-18 K.).
" Af A/ 2. 7 (10. 131. 2-9 K.). Galen uses the same examples in a discussion of
definition in De puis. diff. 2. 3 (8. 573. 1-15 K.).
'* A/M 2. 7 (10. 144. 9-1 1 K.). See also De diff. febr. 2. 6 (7. 348. 7 K.); De puis. diff.
4. 1 (8. 696. 19 K.); De usu part. 8. 4 (3. 629 K. = 1. 456. 3-13 Helmreich); De med. nom.
pp. 8. 17, 32 Meyerhof-Schacht.
" MM 2. 7 (10. 144. 13 K.); cf. De puis. diff. 4. 1 (8. 697. 4-5 K.). The centaur
appears alone in MM 2. 7 (10. 153. 19 K.).
'°° De puis. diff. 3. 3 (8. 652. 2-10 K.). In 3. 4 (8. 662. 4-7 K.) Galen compares
Archigenes' heavy pulse to pXCropi and OKivSayoq.
^°^ The ambiguity of the names of the qualities is a theme to which Galen often returns.
See for example De elem. 1. 6 (1. 460-65 K.); the convenient summary in De simp. med.
3. 2 (11. 542. 11^4. 6 K.); and above. 288-89.
^°2 See for example PHP 2. 4. 4. 5. 26. 8. 2 (pp. 116. 30-31. 132. 25-28. 158. 1-2).
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that the class can be given a name because one and the same thing is present
in all its members. *°^
Galen also makes an argument from definitions. Definition of a name,
6 Xoyoc, xov ovo^axoq,'^ resolves into simple terms the things that the
name combines. The name "fever" combines heat and damage to activity,
and "phrenitis" combines fever and delirium. '^^ 7^5 name av0p(O7io(;
combines animal, rational, and mortal.^^ But if phrenitis is a thing, disease
is also Tipay^d xi. It makes no sense to recognise that phrenitis and
human being, which are non-simple, are things, and not recognize that
disease and animal are things.^^^ Animal, in turn, is a body with sense-
perception. It is absurd to say that body is something and sense-perception
is something, but a body with sense-perception is nothing, or that there is a
body with sense-perception but not an animal. ^^*
This argument from definition in MM 2. 7 places definition on the
level of universals and holds that the universals defined and the universals in
the definition are things (Tipdy^iaTa). There is no hint here of skeptical
doubts about definition. But Sextus questioned it;^^ and Galen tells us that
the empiricists attacked definitional^ and avoided the term.m There were
also some who in their ignorance wanted to define everything,^^^ and some
who considered it useless.^ ^^ Galen himself says in De puis. dijf. that there
are not definitions of everything,^^'* and when everyone knows what a word
means definition serves no useful purpose.^^^
Yet in that same work Galen points out the usefulness of definition
when a concept is not clear. ^^^ But there is a difference between definition
i°3 MM 2. 7 (10. 128. 9-15. 144. 2-45. 2 K.).
i°* MM 2. 7 (10. 151. 15 K.); cf. De puis. dijf. 4. 2 (8. 705. 11-14 K.).
i°5a/A/ 2. 7 (10. 150. 11-51. 11 K.).
^°<*Ibid. 151. 11-12 K.
lO' Ibid. 152. 1-6 K.
>°* Ibid. 153. 14-54. 10 K.
109 Sextus, AM 7. 269-82; PH 2. 205-12; cf. PH 2. 22-32.
"° Gal. De sectis 5 (1. 77 K. = SM 3. 10. 26-11. 2).m The empiricists speak instead of vnoYpatpai and WTtoxyncooeiq. See Gal. De puis,
diff. 4. 2. 3 (8. 709. 1-5, 720. 3-9, 721. 15-16 K.); Subf. emp. 7 (63. 1-10 Deichgr.).
Sextus too uses unoYpacpfj in place of opoe;; see for example AM 6. 42, 8. 9, 12, 244, 314,
454.
"2cf. De puis. diff. 4. 1, 17 (8. 696. 10-13. 698. 4-6, 763. 2-4. 13-15. 764. 10-11
K.).
"3 De puis. diff. 2. 17 (8. 764. 17 K.).
"-* De puis. diff. 2. 3 (8. 570. 16-18 K.).
115 De puis. diff. 4. 1 (8. 696. 13-16 K.); cf. 4. 2 (8. 717. 6-13 K.). See the remarks on
definition in J. Kollesch, "Anschauungen von den dpxcxi in der Ars medica und die
Seelenlehre Galens." Le opere psicologiche di Galeno (Naples 1988) 218-20.
"<*De puis diff. 4. 2. 17 (8. 718. 12-15. 763. 4-8 K.). Galen says in PHP 6. 1. 3-4 (p.
360. 15-21) that sometimes a clear statement of the meaning of a word can by itself solve
a problem.
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of a concept and definition of o-ooia,^^"^ which Galen describes as Xoyoc,
5i5aaKaA,iK6<; xfjq xov npdy\iaxoq oixjiaq.^^^ Ov)aicb5T|(; opcx;, however,
is not a good starting-point for instruction."' Instruction, Galen says,
leads the student from the evvoia to the knowledge of ovoia;^^ and in fact
in his treatise De elementis and also in PHP 8. 2 he begins with a definition
of axoixeiov and proceeds to the proof that the elements are fire, air, water,
earth.121
It appears, then, that Galen's view of definition was complex. But
whatever the varieties and usefulness of definitions, the important point for
the present discussion is that what makes definition possible is the oneness
of the thing defined.
Two parts of Galen's defense of universals remain to be mentioned.
One is his appeal to the authority of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Plato. '^^
The other is his exploitation of Uie curious circumstance that although the
empiricists doubted such universals as disease and human being, they did
recognize that phrenetic is one thing and empiricist is one thing. ^^^ When
asked whether a live empiricist is one with a dead empiricist, they answer
that they are one qua empiricists. Galen's argument is that if Serapion and
Menodotus are one qua empiricists, it is stupid or perverse not to recognize
that since they are both human beings they are one qua human beings. ^2"*
Having now established that the members of a class have a common
nature and participate in a single form, Galen is ready to make inferences by
endeixis to the non-evident. Endeixis reveals what follows from the very
nature of a thing. In MM 2. 7 he explains it in these words: toy (read to)
Toivuv e^ ax>xT[q xT\q xov TipdYiiaxoq (pijoecoq 6p|xa)|ievov e^e\)p{aKeiv to
dcKoXovGov avei) xr\c, 7iE{pa<; £v5£i4£i<; Kal evpeoiv eoti 7ie7ioif|o9(jci.'^
It is the instrument of the rational physician: 6 6e XoyiKo^ ini xt\v (piSaw
De puis. diff. 4. 2 (8. 704. 5-14 K.).117
"" Ibid". 713. 12-13 K.
'^' Ibid. 718. 15-19. 2 K.
12° Ibid. 718. 12-13 K.; cf. MM 1. 5 (10. 40. 12-42. 9 K.).
12' Galen's treatises De lypis, De marcore, and De partium homoeomerium diff. also
begin with definitions.
"22MM 2. 7 (10. 137. 15-38. 4. 139. 16-^0. 1, 141. 16-42. 4 K.); cf. also 143. 12-
14 K. The reference to the Philebus (138. 4 K.) is perhaps to Phileb. 14c, quoted by Galen
in PHP 9. 5. 30 (p. 570. 17).
123mm 2. 7 (10. 135. 10-12 K.).
MM 2. 7 (1
up to p. 144. 9 K.
125 MM 2. 7 (1
Tiiq aKoX,ov6{aq evSei^iv XeYOnev {MM 2. 7 [10. 126. 10-11 K.]); ck xr\q zo\)
jipdyjiaxcq (pvoeox; evSeiKTiKccx; {In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 1. 2 [CMG V 10.2.2, p. 14.
20]); T) evSei^iq ck -^c, xov npdYfiato^ (pvoeco^ opjicojievTi to 6eov e^evpiaKei {MM 3.
1 [10. 157. 1-2 K.]); amf) xcov npayndxcov fi cp-uoii; evSeCtcvvxai {De constit. art. med.
8 [1. 251. 12-13 K.]). There are similar phrases in MM 2. 5, 3. 1 (10. 104. 12, 161. 15
K.); In Hipp. Prorrhet. comm. 2. 59 {CMG V 9.2. p. 104. 17); In Hipp. Epid. Ill comm. 1.
6 {CMG V 10.2.1. p. 32. 21-22).
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avTTiv to\> Tipdy^aToq epxoM-evoq ev6£iKTiKca<; an' cKeivTiq eXq te xt\v
Twv eoo^Evtov npoyvtoaiv Kal eiq tt|v xt\c, Qepanziaq eupEOiv
ovivaxai, xptb^ievoc; ^ev anaai Kal xolc, 8ia neipaq evpiaKo^evoic;,
npoGTiGelq 5e a\)Toi<; ek xfic; XoyiKfiq ^e965o-u noXkd.^^ It is rejected by
empiricists and skeptics.^^"^ It is sequential, the first endeixis followed by
others until the goal, which is to find the cure for every kind of disease, is
reached.'28
The uses of endeixis are not limited to the discovery of cures.^^' An
example from natural science is that winds indicate that when moisture is
changed to air a small amount of moisture produces a very large amount of
air. ^3^ Among animals, the fact that the calf butts before it has horns, and
the young of winged animals try to fly before they are able, indicate that the
souls that use the parts understand and use them as their own creation.* ^i
Among human beings the conflict of reason with desire indicates that there
are two contending powers in us;*^^ and it is by endeixis that the rational
part of the soul is discovered to be in the brain, the spirited part in the
heart. '3^ The variety and consistency of the veins and arteries indicate that
they contain all the humors.*^ The source and power and use of the nerves
are all discovered by endeixisP^ Especially important for Galen's
teleological view of organisms is the inference by endeixis from the
^^^De diff. febr. 1. 3 (7. 282. 1-5 K.); cf. also De sectis 1 (1. 65 K. = SM 3. 2. 2-3);
MM 2. 7, 3. 7 (10. 127. 9-12, 204. 11-13 K.); Subf. emp. 2 (44. 10-13 Deichgr.).
^^ For the empiricists see below, 301 and note 164. Sextus' attack on the evSeiictiKov
onjietov is in PH 2. 99-129. AM 8. 143-298 (see below. 302). We must assume that both
Stoics and rational physicians had theories of endeixis in late Hellenistic times, but there
is httle evidence outside the vague references in Sextus and Galen. The verb £;v8e{Kv\)o6ai
occurs three times in Philodemus, De signis in anti-Stoic contexts, twice (col. xi 1 1 and
xiii 26) in denials of the cogency of Stoic arguments, and once (col. xxxv 26) in an
explanation of the use of Ka66 and p. Endeixis is in Posid. test. 87 Edelstein-Kidd = Gal.
PHP 5. 7. 84 (pp. 356. 31-58. 1) in an epistemological context. In Cicero the terms
declarare, declaratio may be translations of ev5eiKv\)a9ai. evSei^iq in such passages as
De nal. dear. 2. 43: sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxime declarat ordo
eorum atque constantia, and Acad. 1. 41: visis . . . eis solum quae propriam quandam
haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur. In such passages, however, endeixis
does not appear to have the methodological significance that it has for Galen.
^"^ MM 2.1 (10. 127. 12-18 K.).
^^' Excluded from consideration here is the use of endeixis in the explanation of the
meaning of a word or in the inteipretation of a text, whether of Homer or Hippocrates or
Plato or Chrysippus or some other. This usage is very common in Galen. See for example
PHP pp. 156. 11. 158. 22. 218. 11, 236. 16, 244. 15. 252. 28. Endeixis is used also of
the meaning of gestures in PHP pp. 108. 2-A, 8-10; 114. 13-16.
'3°Dc semine 1. 4 (4. 520. 6-16 K.).
131 Defoel.form. 6 (4. 692. 10-18 K.).
132 p^p 5 7 22 (p. 342. 1-5).
i"p//p 2. 7. 17; 6. 3. 4; 6. 8. 39. 44 (pp. 154. 28-32. 372. 29-32. 416. 6-9. 21-24).
1^ De atra bile 5. 1 {CMG V 4.1.1. p. 79. 1-3).
135 PHP 1. 7. 55. 7. 5. 17. 7. 8. 7 (pp. 90. 22-25. 456. 21-25. 476. 19-21).
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structure of the body to the wisdom and power of the divine artisan who
fashioned it.^^
In pathology endeixis is on the level of the individual. The patient's
behavior or his symptoms indicate his condition, and his condition indicates
what action should be taken. A dry tongue combined with fever of a certain
kind is sufficient indication of the state of the liver. ^^'^ An injury to the
spinal cord is indicated by the parts that receive their nerves from it.^^^ The
patient's habits are indicative of the nature of his body.^^' His condition
may be indicated even by what he dreams about. ^"^^ Here universals are
present, presumably, in that the patient's symptoms enable the physician to
classify him and so draw the appropriate inference. ^'*^
From the patient's condition the cure is found by endeixis: a
dispositionibus inveniri indicative curam}^'^ This indication of the cure
depends on one's medical theory. Galen tells us that the physician must
master logical method in order to know by genus and species how many
diseases there are and how to take from each disease an indication, endeixis,
of the cure.^'*^ Galen's training in the methods of proof enabled him to
judge the views of others, and in his cures he was guided by the endeixis of
what he discovered: iac, r[ xcov eupEGevxcov £v6ei^i<; e7to6TiY£i jie, xocq
GepoTieia*; eTtoioiS^riv.^^
Finding the endeixis of the cure in the diathesis of the patient has a
superficial resemblance to the endeixis of the methodists. As Galen
explains it, the methodists held that unnatural conditions indicate their
remedies. A stone in the bladder indicates removal. A dislocated joint
13^ See for example PHP 9. 8. 12 (p. 594. 2-A); De foet.form. 6 (4. 687. 13-14. 693.
12-15 K.); In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 5. 4 {CMC V 10.2.2. p. 265. 14-15). In De usu
partium Galen finds many indications of the wisdom and skill of the artisan who fashioned
the bodies of men and animals; see for example 17. 1 (4. 346-62 K. = 2. 437-49
Helmreich).
1" In Hipp. Epid. in comm. 1. 6 (CMG V 10.2.1. p. 30. 30-31).
^^* In Hipp. Prorrhet. comm 2. 34 (CMG V 9.2. p. 80. 17-20). reading aux© with
Comarius at 80. 19.
139A/M9. 16(10.654. 15-16 K.).
^*°In Hipp. Epid I comm. 3. 1 {CMC V 10.1. p. 108. 1-21).
^^^ See below, note 143. and De curandi ratione per venae sect. 3 (11. 258. 14-18 K.),
where Galen speaks of the need to classify by species and differentia the conditions that
require evacuation.
^^^De caus. content. 10. 8 {CMC Suppl. Or. H. p. 141. 33-34; cf. p. 73. 14-15). There
are many similar statements in Galen's other works. See for example De sectis 3 (1. 70 K.
= SM 3. 5. 16-17). Other circumstances besides the patient's 6id0eoi<; may enter into the
indication of what is helpful; cf. De sectis 3 (1. 70. 72 K. = SM 3. 5. 16-6. 1. 6. 25-26);
In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 3. 47 (CMC V 10.2.2. p. 187. 4-9). Indications of cures derived
from differences in eXtoi are mentioned in MM 3. 10 (10. 221. 15-17 K.).
^*^ Quod opt. med. sit quoque philos. 3. 4 (1. 59-60. 62 K. = SM 2. 6. 10-14, 7. 2-3,
8. 5-6).
^**MM 1. 5 (10. 469. 14-70. 2 K.).
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indicates a return to its proper place.^''^ The methodists' endeixis, however,
does not depend on logical method or medical theory. Indeed Sextus found it
consistent with skepticism. ''^^ Galen gave it a limited role in medicine.
Everyone agrees that the first indications are taken from the diathesis, but
this is only at the beginning of the science of medicine. ^"^"^ It requires no
medical skill; it is obvious even to the layman.'"** Although it indicates
what is to be done, only the physician knows how to do it.''*' The
methodists are at fault also in that they neglect circumstances relevant to the
treatment of the diathesis, and they are not even clear about the distinction
between natural and unnatural.'^^
The superficial resemblance to the methodists' endeixis is in Galen's
use of such phrases as to p.ev yap v6aTip.a a-uxo rnq ea-uxot) SiaGeoecoq
ev6eiKv\)Tai xa PoTiGrmaxa, and xtiv ^ev evSei^iv xo\> PoTi0Ti|j.axo<; octio
zr\<^ Kttxa x6 aal»|j.a 6ia0EOEa)<; zka.^z}^'^ But the difference is that for
Galen endeixis is a relation of dKoX,ot)0ia. One diing follows from another
in accordance with some rational principle. Normally there is a causal
relation behind the endeixis, or one thing is a necessary condition of
another. In the visible symptoms, Galen says in De sectis, there is for the
dogmatist an indication of the cause, and from that he finds the cure.'^^ The
choice of drugs is indicated by the degree to which the affected part must be
dried and cooled. '^^ Symptoms may also indicate the strength or weakness
of the body.'^ When there is a conflict between the treaunent indicated by
the affected part and that indicated by the patient's nature, the well-trained
physician is best able to estimate (axoxa^eoGai) what drug should be
used.'^^ A future event may be indicated by a symptom when the symptom
and the future event are both effects of the same cause. '^^
Galen describes the endeixis of the methodists in De sectis 6-7 and MM 3. 1.
"*^ Sextus, PH 1. 236-41, especiaUy 240.
"*'MAf 3. 1 (10. 157. 7-58. 4 K.).
^^^MM 3. 1 (10. 158. 10-12 K.).
^^^MM 3. 1 (10. 158. 15-16 K.).
'^^ Galen presents criticisms of the methodists made by both empiricists and
dogmatists in De sect. 8-9.
"^1
In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm. 1. 43, 44 {CMG V 9.1. pp. 159. 15-16. 160. 19-20).
See also De curandi rat. per venae sect. 3 (11. 258. 16-17 K.): xov apiGnov xuv
evSeiKvunevtov tfjv kcvoxtiv SiaGeoetov. and De sectis 3 (1. 70 K. = SM 3. 5. 16-18):
otTi' auxfiq xr\c, SiaGeoeox; fi evSei^iq aiixoii; (sc. xoiq SoyjiaxiKoii;) xou o«|i(pepovxo(;
yCyvexai.
"2d« sect. 4 (1. 73 K. = SM 3. 7. 19-21; cf. 3. 7. 23-25).
*"A/M 3. 8 (10. 212. 11-17 K.).
*^ See for example In Hipp. Progn. comm. 1. 8, 2. 28, 3. 15 (CMC V 9.2. pp. 216. 23.
284. 3-7, 343. 22-23).
^^^ MM 3. 9 (10. 216. 8-17. 17 K.). There is another example of conflicting
indications in In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm. 1. 43 (CMG V 9.1. p. 159. 15-23).
15* For examples see In Hipp. Progn. comm. 1. 21 (CMG V 9.2, p. 234. 16-22) (death),
and ibid. 2. 27 (p. 282. 18-24) (recovery).
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Galen also speaks of indication, perhaps improperly, when there is
more than one explanation of a symptom. *^^ Even more surprising is the
remark in De semine 2. 6 (4. 651. 1-2 K.): ti yap xoxt ^wpiov Koivcovta
Kttl TTiv xfiq xpzioic, avxGiv Koivtoviav eve5Ei^aTo, TtiGavox; ^lev, ovk
dXiiGaK; 6e. Apparently Galen allowed himself some latitude in the use of
the term.
Galen recognized that endeixis is an inference from a sign, ormEiov or
Yvcopio|a.a,*^* We find such phrases as EvSeiKvuiievtov xcav oTijieicov
veviKfjoGai,^^' ^o^Gripov eivai to oTHJ-eiov xotiTo, veKpcoaiv xiva . . .
ev5eucv'u^evov,^^^ td te xoiavxa yvtopia^iaxa Kal xd xa>v a(pvy^G)v
EvSEi^Exai xiva Sidjcpioiv,^^^ etiI ydp dvo^ioion; yvtopio^aoiv dvo^ioiov
Eivai xpTl Kttl XTiv £v6ei^iv,^^2 g^^ g^g gj, indicativis signis noticiam}^^
It is as a sign-relation that endeixis was rejected by the empiricists and
doubted by the skeptics. In his De seeds Galen gives the argument of the
empiricists that one thing cannot be known from another: \ir\S' ev5ei^iv
undpxEvv x6 Tiapdnav )iti6' EXEpov e^ kxipov 6ijvao0ai yvcooGfivai-
Tidvxa ydp 6EiaGai xf|<; e^ a{)xcov yv(oa£co<; |iti6' Eivai xi armEiov
d6TiXo\) (p-uaEi npdy^iaxoq ox>bE\/6c,.^^ They argued also that the same
appearance may be accompanied at different times by different non-evident
things, and thus disagreement arises for which there is no test.^^^
In De peccat. dignot. Galen again presents the argument from the
disagreement of dogmatists. This time the context is ethical, and his
The examples that I noted are all in commentaries on Hippocrates, In Hipp. Epld. I
comm. 2. 27 {CMC V 10.1, p. 65. 1-2); In Hipp. Epid. Ill comm. 1. 6 {CMG V 10.2.1, p.
30. 19); In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 5. 14 {CMG V 10.2.2, p. 286. 23-26). Sextus points
out (AW 8. 201) that the indicative sign must be the sign of one thing only.
*^* In In Hipp. Progn. comm. 3. 44 {CMC V 9.2, pp. 372-76). in discussing the tenms
ormeiov and TCKufipiov, Galen remarks that according to the xap'-e<J^epoi. ormeiov is
used of that which is ek TT|pf|oe(o<;, xEKuripiov of that which is e^ evSei^eox;. In his own
usage, however, Galen does not observe this distinction.
^^ In Hipp. Prorrhel. comm. 1. 2 {CMG V 9.2, p. 10. 27); cf. ibid. (p. 11. 6-8, 12-15)
and 3. 76 (p. 177. 21-22).
'^/n Hipp. Progn. comm. 1. 15 {CMG V 9.2, p. 230. 2-3); cf. ibid. 3. 15 (p. 343. 22-
23).
1" In Hipp. Progn. comm. 1. 8 {CMG V 9.2, p. 217. 16-17).
^^^PHP 6. 5. 5 (p. 388. 22-23). Cf. also In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 3. 30 {CMG V
10.2.2, p. 168. 4-5).
^^' De caus. content. 10. 5 {CMG Suppl. Or. 11, p. 141. 23); cf. mifieiov evSeiKTiKov,
In Hipp. Epid. VI comm, 5. 14 {CMG V 10.2.2. p. 286. 23).
^^De sectis 5 (1. 77 K. = SM 3. 10. 22-25 = 105. 26-29 Deichgr.). Cf. also Subf.
emp. 1 and 2 (43. 4-10 and 44. 4-6 Deichgr.). In De sect. 8 (1. 89 K. = SM 3. 19. 23-24)
Galen puts ev8eiKvu^ev(ov in the mouth of his spokesman for empiricism, but it is in a
criticism of the methodists and reflects their usage.
1" De sectis 5 (1. 78-79 K. = SM 3. 11. 19-12. 4 = 106. 8-16 Deichgr.). In De caus.
content. 10 {CMG Suppl. Or. 11, pp. 71-73, 141) Galen charges the empiricists with
violating their own principles when they call syndromes of symptoms signs of non-
evident states of the body and then call these non-evident states the causes of evident
states.
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opponents are the skeptics. Since philosophers disagree about good and
evil, the Academics and Pyrrhonists consider it rash to assent to any opinion
about them.^^ Galen's answer is that disagreement arises because not only
physicians but even good philosophers who have not been trained in
apodeictic method are misled by false arguments that closely resemble true
ones. The remedy is daily practice in logic and avoidance of rash
statements. With the proper method one may arrive at true knowledge of
good and evil.^^'^
A comparison of Galen's account of the attack on endeixis with Sextus'
lengthy discussions in PH 2. 99-129 and AM 8. 143-298 reveals many
differences but some similarities. The indicative sign, Sextus says, ek Tf|(;
ibiac, (pvaecoq Kal Kaxa(5KZ\)T\<^ OT||j.aivei to oi) eoxi armeiov.^^* Galen's
formula, e^ a-uxfjq xr\c, xot) n{>a.y\iaxoc, cp-uoEox; (see above, 293), does not
include KataoKevTi, but endeixis rests on KaxaoKEvri in such passages as
De instr. odor. 3. 8 {CMG Suppl. V, p. 42. 16): dno xfi<; KaxaoKEvfiq
xfiv ev5ei^iv xou ^Tixo-u^iEvo-u Xa^pdvovxaq and PHP 7. 3. 30 (p. 446.
11): xovxo XE ox>\f at)x6 xfiq KaxaoKEu-nq xcov ^lopicov £v6£i4aM-£VTi(; and
many others. ^^'
Both Galen and Sextus see endeixis as a relation of logical consequence
between sign and thing signified. ^''•^ Sextus formulates this relation as a
conditional, the conclusion following on the condition. ^''^ Galen does not
ordinarily explain endeixis as a conditional, but presumably it could always
be so formulated. Many of the conditionals that appear from time to time
in his works could be considered instances of endeixis, for example, "If the
offspring resemble each of their parents, they resemble them by virtue of a
cause common to both."^^^ j^ ^^ ^am^. content. 10. 6, where Galen places
two endeixeis in sequence, they are, according to the Latin text, si hec sunt
signa, hee sunt cause, and si hee sunt cause, hec est cura}'^'^
In his explanation of the relation of indicator to what is indicated Galen
uses the terms £)i(paai(; and EjxcpaCvEaGai: xt]v ydp olov £|i(paaiv ir\c,
(XKoXo-uGiaq e'vSei^iv lzyo\iVJ. The empiricist, he says, also discovers x6
^^De peccat. dignot. 1. 6 {CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 42. 15^3. 2).
^^''ibid. 2. 2-7 (pp. 43. 17-44. 20); cf. 3. 14 (p. 49. 17-21). That disagreement is a
sign of ignorance and lack of training in logic is a point made by Galen in In Hipp. De
Vict. acut. comm. 1. 14 {CMG V 9.1. p. 127. 23-24) and Adv. lul. 5. 9 (CMG V 10.3. p.
50. 11-12).
'<* Sextus. PH 2. 101: cf. AM 8. 154. 276.
1^ See for example PHP 9. 8. 12 (p. 594. 3); De usu part. 17. 1 (4. 360 K. = 2. 447. 19-
20 Helmreich); Defoet.form. 6 (4. 687. 13-14 K.).
''O For Galen, see In Hipp. Progn. comm. 3. 44 {CMG V 9.2. p. 373. 8): ti 8" e^
aKoX,o\)9iaq XoyiKfi<;. onep eoxiv ev8ei^i<;.
^'1 See Sextus. AM 8. 272. 276.
^'^ Gal. De semine 2. 1 (4. 609. 7-9 K.).
^'^ De caus. content. 10. 6 {CMG Suppl. Or. U, p. 141. 26-27). In Lyons' translation
of the Arabic, however (ibid. p. 73. 5-6). the introductory word is "when."
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dcKoXovGov, but not as ep.<paiv6p,evov x© TiyouiiEvcp.i'''* Sextus' term,
taken from the Stoic definition of sign, is EKKaXvTixiKov.i'^^ g^ j^ p^j 2
112 Sextus says that some dogmatists, using eVcpaaic; as a criterion, say
that a conditional is true in which the consequent is contained potentially
(6\)vd^Ei) in the antecedent. This could conceivably be intended as an
interpretation of Galen's emphasis. If endeixis is from effect to cause, as it
often is in Galen, Sextus' explanation of emphasis would mean that the
cause is somehow contained in the effect. This is in fact the case in Galen's
explanation of quahtative change. The four active qualities (hot, cold, dry,
wet) change an object by making it like themselves.^^^ When they generate
humors in the body by acting on nutriment, their powers are passed on to
the humors that they produce. They are in the body potentially, not
actually: 6\)vdnei jiev ydp eotiv ev xoTq aw^iaaiv, evepyeCoc 6e otJk
Eoxiv.'^'^ Whether Galen would have considered an inference from the
humors to the qualities that cause them an example of emphasis must
remain uncertain; but in any case we must recognize the possibility that
Galen was one of the rational physicians that Sextus included among the
proponents of indicative signs. ^^^
The charge that there are disputes among dogmatists that cannot be
resolved by any test appears to have been the argument that Galen considered
the most serious. ^^' Galen's answer is that there are tests. In more recent
times, he says, physicians have neglected to watch accurately what happens
to the sick and to seek out their conditions and the causes from which the
cure is discovered, the cure itself being judged also by TiEvpa.'^^ Those who
have mastered apodeictic method should test by nEipa whether they have
really solved a problem, as a geometer who has found a method for dividing
a line into equal parts has the result as witness.'*' The person who designs
a sundial follows a logical method that indicates to him where to draw the
lines, and he then checks the lines for accuracy against other sundials and
^''* MM 2.1 (10. 126. 10-12 K.).
*'^ The word etcKaA-wnxiKov is in the definition of indicative sign in Sextus, PH 2. 101,
a passage bracketed by Mau. It has, however, a prominent place in Sextus' attack on the
indicative sign. It is in the Stoic definition of sign (PH 2. 104), and is discussed in PH 2.
116-20. See also Sextus, AM S. 245, 251-53, 256, 257, 273. In AM 8. 165
eKKaXvnTiKov is paired with (itivwtikov. In AM 8. 154 Sextus says that the indicative
sign all but announces what it indicates.
''^ See PHP 6. 6. 28 (p. 400. 22-23, with the note on p. 668).
*''' PHP 8. 4. 21 (p. 502. 19-25).
'^* Sextus, AM 8. 156. Another rather close parallel between Galen and Sextus is
mentioned below, note 197.
''' For the empiricists see Gal. De sectis 5 (1. 78 K. = SM 3. 11. 20-22); for the
skeptics see Gal. De diebus decret. 1. 3 (9. 778. 7-18 K.) and Sextus, PH 2. 116, AM 8.
257, 288.
1*° Gal. In Hipp. Epid. VI comm. 3. 30 {CMG V 10.2.2, p. 167. 21-25).
^*l De peccat. dignot. 3. 1-7 {CMG V 4.1.1, pp. 46. 1-47. 21).
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against an even flow of water. '^^ jq disagree when a test is available is as
ridiculous as the dispute of the two philosophers, one of whom argued at
length on theoretical grounds that wood is heavier than water, the other that
water is heavier than wood, as if it were impossible to settle the matter by
observation.^*^
There are of course disputes concerning matters about which no
apodeictic proof is possible and no test is available, for example, whether
the cosmos had a beginning, or whether the whole is finite or infinite.^*'*
On such matters one should suspend judgment. The question of the
substance of the divine craftsman is also unanswerable. We know from his
works that he exists, but we do not know his ovoia.^^^ Galen even admits
to a Cameadean doubt whether noxious animals were divinely created,'*^ but
he rejects the argument that what looks like the work of an artisan may in
fact be a matter of chance.'*^ Closer to medicine, Julianus had argued that
we should not use the word "nature," since we do not know what nature is.
Galen concedes that it is difficult or impossible to know the oiioia of nature
or soul. We say that every plant is governed by nature, and every animal by
nature and soul, when we do not know the oxxsia of either. But, he adds, it
is difficult also to know the ovoia of sense-perception, thought, memory,
or reasoning. That is hardly surprising, when we do not even know the
ovoia of the sun, which we see most clearly.'**
In those matters, then, where our logical method does not help us and
no test is available, we must acknowledge our ignorance.'*^ But even where
a logical inference can be made and can be confirmed by a test, the test
182 Ibid. 5. 1-4 (pp. 54. 20-55. 27).
1" Ibid. 7. 2-3 (p. 66. 1-9); cf. 7. 7 (p. 67. 1-^). See also De caus. procat. 16 (CMG
Suppl. n, p. 4. 24-26): dissonancie que in rationibus experientia est maximum
iudicatorium.
1** De peccat. dignot. 3. 4 (CMG V 4.1.1, p. 46. 23-25); cf. 7. 8-11 (pp. 67. 6-68. 4).
See also In Hipp. De vict. acut. comm. 1. 12 {CMC V 9.1. p. 125. 9-16).
185 pijp 9 9 2_3 (p. 598. 2-11). On the wisdom and power of the divine craftsman see
above, 298-99 and note 136.
186 Z)£ foet. form. 6 (4. 701. 1-5 K.); cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 120, De nat. dear. 3. fr. 7 (pp.
1230-32 in Pease's edition, with Pease's note ad loc.).
187 pfjp 9 g 4_9 (pp 590. 22-92. 21). For Cameades, see Cic. De div. 1. 23.
188 Adv. lul. 5. 1-5 (CMC V 10.3, pp. 47. 17^9. 5). The theme that we do not know
the owaia of the soul is commonplace in Galen's writings. Some references are collected
in PHP p. 675, note to p. 444. 4-8. According to De foet. form. 6 (4. 687. 10-12 K.), we
all speak of nature as the cause of birth, but we do not know its ouoia; cf. also PHP 9. 8.
27 (p. 596. 22-29). As for the ov>o{a of the sun (Adv. lul. p. 49. 2-5), Galen had chided
the latter-day Academics for saying that the sun is not Kaxa\r]nz6c,: De opt. doctr. 1 (1. 40
K. = 179. 6-8 Barigazzi). The difference, I suppose, between Galen and the Academics is
that for Galen there is some real object, whatever it is, that makes the regular movements
apparent to us, whereas the Academics stop with the appearances.
18' It should be noted that Galen recognizes the possibility that a question to which
only a likely answer can now be given may receive a "truer" (dXtiGeoxepa) answer in the
future: De semine 2. 6 (4. 649. 15-17 K.).
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comes after the inference. The endeixis itself is made ave\) xfjq neipac,}^^
How then do we establish the necessary relation between the evident and the
non-evident that makes the inference valid? The answer lies in those truths
that are clear to the mind. Inferences from effect to cause are governed by
such clear and generally accepted truths as that nothing happens without a
cause,^'' that which is undergoing change arrives at a form similar to that
which is changing it,^'^ peculiarities of substance have their own
peculiarities of powers. '^^ Galen has many such truths which he invokes as
he needs them.^''* They are starting-points for reasoning (X^oyiKal dpxai),
for they are accepted without proof.^'^ When therefore the skeptics and
empiricists doubt that we can know the ovoia of the power of drugs, and the
dogmatists who say that it is knowable advance conflicting theories, Galen
can explain the power not only of drugs but of all else in terms of the
qualities of the thing that causes the change. ^'^
This explanation, however, depends on Galen's theory of the elements
and their mixture in bodies, whether animate or inanimate, and for that
Galen refers the reader to his works On the elements according to
Hippocrates and On mixtures. In the former he presents his proofs that
there is more than one element, that the elements undergo qualitative
change, that there are only four qualities that can change an object through
and through, that these four qualities cannot exist apart from matter, that the
four combinations of quality with matter produce four elements, that in the
world as we know it these four elements are not found in their pure form but
only in combination.^^'' In the work On mixtures he points out that in any
1''° See above. 297 and note 125. •
I'l See PHP 4. 4. 36 (p. 258. 13. with p. 646, note to p. 258. 13-14). Galen was aware
of. and participated in. controversies about causes; see Bardong's introduction to his
edition of De caus. procatarc, CMG Suppl EI, pp. xii-xxxiii.
^'^ Eiq ojioiav i6eav t^ jietaPaXXovxi x6 fiexaPaXXonevov dcpiicveixai, PHP 6. 8.
13 (p. 410. 13-14); cf. ibid. 6. 6. 28 (p. 400. 21-23); De semine 1. 11. 12 (4. 553. 4-5.
556. 16-17 K.); De usu part. 4. 12. 14. 10 (3. 298, 4. 185 K. = 1. 219. 6-8, 2. 317. 11-
14 Helmreich).
mpffp-j 5 14 (p. 456. 11-12).
^''* See for example MM 1. 4 (10. 36. 15-37. 3 K.) and the passages coUected in PHP
pp. 698-99. note to p. 544. 17-19.
^'5 MM 1.4 (10. 37. 6-7 K.); cf. PHP 9. 8. 1 (p. 590. 12) and Thrasybulus 24 (5. 847
K. = SM 3. 62. 9-10).
^'<*D« simp. med. 1. 1 (11. 380. 18-81. 12 K.). Diocles (cf. De alim.fac. 1. 1. 4-6
[CMG V 4.2. pp. 202. 25-03. 24]) and Quintus (fn Hipp. Epid. I comm. 2. 7 [CMG V 10.1.
p. 52. 26-29]) were among those who rejected a theoretical approach to the action of
drugs.
''"' See especiaUy De elem. 1. 2, 5. 7. 8. In De elem. 1. 9 (1. 489 K. = 56. 2-7
Helmreich) Galen raises but leaves unanswered the question whether mixtures are of
qualities only or of corporeal substances. He alludes to this same problem also in De nat.
fac. 1. 2 and 2. 4 (2. 5. 92 K. = SM 3. 104. 11-15. 168. 11-14); MM 1. 2 (10. 16. 12-15
K.); In Hipp. De nat. horn. comm. 1. 3 (CMG V 9.1, p. 19. 4-7); and De prop. plac. 4.
762. 9-16 K. Sextus {PH 3. 57-62) uses the problem whether mixtures are of qualities or
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combination of the four elements there may be an even balance of qualities,
or one or two qualities may dominate.^'* When one thing causes a change
in another, therefore, the change can be traced back to the dominant quality
of the cause.^^
Inference from structure also depends on universal truths, for example,
larger things are sources of smaller things,^^^ the governing part of the soul
is the source of sense-perception and voluntary motion.^oi what is rightly
made in all its parts is assigned to art.^^ When Galen makes an inference
by endeixis without slating the universal truth, whether needing no proof or
proved earlier, we must assume that if asked he would supply it.
The answer to those who would question the possibility of proof is
now clear,2^3 Proof (dnoSei^K;) follows ev5ei^i<; as the final step in
Galen's scientific method.^^ It confirms endeixis by supplying the
universal truth that validates it. There is no infinite regress, since there are
starting-points, the universal truths that are accepted without proof, and clear
sense-perceptions that require no criterion.^^^ Even the philosophers who
contentiously question all demonstration understand, even if they do not say
so, that if the XoyiKal dpxai are not trusted, nothing can be proved.^^ So
we end up where we began, with truths clear to the senses and clear to the
mind. On them the whole of Galen's medical theory is based, and without
them it would collapse.-^^
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substances or both in his argument against the dogmatists' theory of the mixture of the
elements.
1'* On the nine kinds of erases see De temp. 1. 8 (1. 554-59 K. = 29. 3-32. 4
Helmreich).
^" A corollary of this theory is that when a cold drug causes heat in the body the drug is
said to be potentially hot. See De temp. 3. 1 (1. 649-51 K. = 87. 25-89. 14 Helmreich).
200 PHP 6. 3. 20. 32 (pp. 378. 6, 380. 25-28).
201 PHP 8. 1. 1 (p. 480. 8-9).
202p//P9. 8. 9 (p. 592. 19-20).
20^ Galen mentions the empiricists' rejection of proof in De sectis 5 (1. 77 K. = SM 3.
11. 1-2 = 105. 30-32 Deichgr.). He wrote a treatise, now lost, on Clitomachus' attack on
proof: De libr. prop. 11 (19. 44 K. = SM 2. 120. 3-4).
20* Cf. De peccat. dignot. 3. 20-21 (CMC V 4.1.1, p. 51. 6-15), where, in spite of the
difficult text, it is clear that Galen differentiates three levels, x6 Ttptorcoq xe Kai e^ avxovi
nioTov. 6 Xofoc, ji6vTi<; evSei^ecoq Seojievoq. and dn68ei^i(;.
205 See for example De alim. fac. 1. 1. 3 {CMG V 4.2. p. 202. 14-16). Of course the
conclusion of one proof (to npoa7to6e5ei7M.evov) may be used as the premise of another;
cf. De temp. 2. 2 (1. 587 K. = 50. 1^ Helmreich). There is a sequence of such proofs in De
semine 2. 1 (4. 609-10 K.). where one step, missing from the Greek, is supplied by the
Arabic. (I am indebted to Dr. Strohmaier for this information.)
206 See above. 287 and note 35.
20^
I am indebted to R. J. Durling for help in finding Galen's references to skepticism.
